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Abstract
We consider in this paper a duopoly competing in quantities and where
rms can invest in R&D to control their emissions. We distinguish be-
tween e¤ort carried out to acquire rst-hand knowledge (original R&D)
and e¤ort to develop an absorptive capacity to be able to capture part
of the knowledge developed by rival. There are also free R&D spillovers
between rms. We show that a regulator can reach the social optimal
outcome by implementing a taxation and subsidy policy. The regulator
subsidizes at a higher rate original R&D e¤ort than its absorptive capac-
ity counterpart when the free spillovers are high, and the contrary may
occur when the free spillovers are low. When the cost of original research
is lower than the one of absorptive research, or when the learning parame-
ter of the latter is low, then the socially optimal level of original research
is higher than the one of absorptive capacity. We have the opposite re-
sult when the cost of absorptive capacity is lower than the one of original
research and when the learning parameter is high.
Key Words: Pollution Control; Original R&D; Absorptive Capacity;
Taxes and Subsidies; Social Optimum.
1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that (i) development and di¤usion of cleaner technologies
play an important role in achieving environmental quality goals; (ii) rms ben-
et from each others investments in research and development (R&D) through
voluntary (e.g., joint venture) and/or involuntary spillovers, and (iii) regulators
can inuence rmsR&D e¤orts for emissions reduction through economic in-
centives (e.g., taxes and subsidies). The aim of this paper is to characterize
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the socially optimal production (or emissions), investment in R&D and absorp-
tive capacity, tax and subsidy rates in a game played by two duopolists and a
regulator.
One of the early studies in this area is Milliman and Prince (1989). The au-
thors considered a competitive industry formed of identical rms and evaluated
the relative merits of di¤erent environmental policy instruments for promoting
technological change in pollution control, namely, direct controls, emissions sub-
sidies, emissions taxes, free marketable permits, and auctioned marketable per-
mits. Milliman and Prince showed that emissions taxes and auctioned permits
provide the highest rm incentives to promote technological change. Jung, Kru-
tilla and Boyd (1996) extended this comparative approach to a heterogeneous
industry. Stranlund (1997) considered public aid to encourage the adoption of
superior emissions-control technologies combined with monitoring. This strat-
egy is attractive when monitoring is di¢ cult because the sources of pollution
are widely dispersed or the emissions are not easily measured as in non-point
pollution problems. Technological aid reduces the direct enforcement e¤ort nec-
essary for rms to reach the compliance goal. Consequently, rms adopt better
control technologies, which may serve to promote further innovative activity.
Requate and Unold (2003) investigated incentives given by environmental pol-
icy instruments to adopt advanced abatement technology. Fischer and Newell
(2008) assessed di¤erent policies for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and en-
couraging innovation and di¤usion of renewable energy. They evaluated the
relative performance of policies according to incentives provided for emissions
reduction, e¢ ciency, and other outcomes. They also assessed how the nature of
technological progress through learning and R&D, and the degree of knowledge
spillovers, a¤ected the desirability of di¤erent policies. Because of the knowledge
spillovers, optimal policy involves a portfolio of di¤erent instruments targeted at
emissions, learning, and R&D. Although the relative cost of individual policies
in achieving reductions depends on parameter values and the emissions target,
in a numerical application to the U.S. electricity sector, the ranking is roughly
as follows: (1) emissions price, (2) emissions performance standard, (3) fossil
power tax, (4) renewables share requirement, (5) renewables subsidy, and (6)
R&D subsidy. Nonetheless, an optimal portfolio of policies achieves emissions
reductions at a signicantly lower cost than any single policy.
Dosi and Moretto (1997) studied the regulation of a rm which can switch to
a green technology by incurring an irreversible investment cost. This technolog-
ical switch is expected to provide appropriable benets surrounded, however, by
a certain degree of uncertainty. To bridge the gap between the private and the
policy-makers desired timing of innovation, they recommended that the regu-
lator should stimulate the innovation by subsidies and by reducing the uncer-
tainty surrounding the protability of the new technology through appropriate
announcements. Farzin and Kort (2000) studied the regulation of a competi-
tive rm and examined the e¤ect of a higher pollution tax rate on abatement
investment, both under full certainty and when the timing or the size of the tax
increase is uncertain. They showed the possibility that a higher pollution tax
rate induces more pollution and that a credible threat to accelerate the tax in-
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crease can lead to more abatement investment. Ben Youssef (2009) considered
a non-cooperative and symmetric three-stage game played by two regulator-
rm hierarchies. He showed that R&D spillovers and the competition of rms
on the common market help non-cooperating countries to better internalize
transboundary pollution. Surprisingly, international competition increases the
per-unit emissions-tax and decreases the per-unit R&D subsidy. Ulph (1996)
studied the strategic behavior of governments and producers by taking the con-
text of a world market. Moreover, he assumed that R&D reduces production
costs and that governments can use only one instrument, an emissions-tax or an
emissions-standard, to control pollution. Conrad (1993) constructed a model of
international duopoly with negative externalities in production in which optimal
environmental policy responses to foreign emissions-tax and subsidy programs
can be calculated. However, he did not consider R&D possibilities and took the
context of an international market. Also, with a model of imperfectly compet-
itive international markets and without pollution, Spencer and Brander (1983)
showed that there are national incentives to subsidize R&D if export subsidies
are not available.
In the above literature, the assumption is either there are no technological
spillovers between the rms or when they occur, they are free. As pointed
out in many papers in the industrial organization literature, this assumption
may be strong in the sense that rms need to acquire an absorptive capacity to
assimilate and exploit available information to benet from these technological
spillovers.
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) were the rst to introduce the idea of absorp-
tive capacity in the (process or cost reduction) R&D literature. Contrary to
the result in the seminal paper by dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988,1990)
were R&D spillovers are assumed exogenous and cost free, Cohen and Levinthal
showed that intra-industry spillovers may encourage R&D investment. Poyago-
Theotoky (1999) analyzed a simple non-tournament model of R&D where rms
engage to reduce their cost of innovation. She showed that, when spillovers of
information are endogenized, non-cooperative rms never disclose any of their
information, whereas they will always fully share their information when they
cooperate in R&D. Kamien and Zang (2000) modeled a rms e¤ectiveR&D
level that reects how both its R&D approach (rm specic or general) and R&D
level inuence its absorptive capacity. The choice of the R&D approach is
made in the rst stage, while the rmsR&D budgets and output levels are cho-
sen in the second and third stages of the game, respectively. They found that
when rms cooperate in R&D, they choose identical R&D approaches. Nev-
ertheless, when they do not form a research joint venture (RJV), they choose
rm-specic R&D approaches unless there is no danger of exogenous spillovers.
In contrast to the Kamien and Zangs nding, Wiethaus (2005) showed that
competing rms choose identical R&D approaches in order to maximize knowl-
edge ows between each other.
Grünfeld (2003), considered a two-stage game and showed that the absorp-
tive capacity e¤ects of own R&D drive up the incentive to invest in R&D when
the market size is small or the absorptive capacity e¤ect is weak. Otherwise,
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rms will really choose to cut down on R&D. Finally, he showed that strong
learning e¤ects of own R&D are not necessarily good for welfare and that, if
the market size is large, welfare will be at its highest when the learning e¤ect is
small. Leahy and Neary (2007) specied a general model of the absorptive ca-
pacity process and showed that costly absorption raises the e¤ectiveness of own
R&D and lowers the e¤ective spillover coe¢ cient thus weakening the case for
encouraging RJV even if there is complete information sharing between rms.
Milliou (2009) showed that the lack of full appropriability can lead to an increase
in R&D investments. Hammerschmidt (2006) considered a two-stage game in
which R&D plays a dual role: First, it generates new knowledge and second, it
develops a rms absorptive capacity. She found that rms will invest more in
R&D to strengthen absorptive capacity when the spillover parameter is higher.
We consider a three-stage game consisting of a regulator and two identical
rms competing in quantities and producing the same homogeneous good. The
production process generates pollution and rms can invest in R&D to lower
their emissions/output ratio. Firms invest in original researchwhich directly
reduce their emissions/output ratios. They also invest in absorptive capacity
research enabling a rm to exploit the original research made by others. There
are also free R&D spillovers between rms. Since rms constitute a duopoly and
pollute the environment, they are regulated. In the rst stage, the regulator
announces a tax per-unit of pollution to induce the socially optimal level of
pollution and production, a subsidy per-unit of original research to induce the
socially optimal level of original research, and a subsidy per-unit of absorptive
capacity research to induce the socially optimal level of absorptive capacity
research. In the second stage, rms invest in R&D and in the third one they
compete in quantities on the product market.
We show that, by means of the emissions-tax and R&D subsidies, the reg-
ulator can induce rms to implement the socially optimal levels of production
and R&D. The regulator subsidizes at a higher rate absorptive capacity R&D
e¤ort than its original research counterpart when the free spillovers are low and
the marginal disutility of pollution is high, and the contrary occurs when the
free spillovers are high. When the cost of absorptive research is lower than the
one of original research and the learning parameter is high, then the socially
optimal level of absorptive research is higher than the one of original research.
We have the opposite result when the cost of original research is lower than the
one of absorptive capacity, or when the learning parameter is low.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 presents the model and
Section 3 provides the conditions veried by the socially optimal production
and R&D levels. In Section 4, we study the reaction of rms and derive the
socially optimal regulatory instruments. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The model
We consider an industry made up of two rms producing a homogeneous good
sold on a market having the following inverse demand function:
p(qi; qj) = a  (qi + qj); a > 0:
When producing, rm i emits some pollutants which are subject to a per-unit
tax ti imposed by the regulator. To reduce the tax burden, rms can either de-
crease their outputs or invest in abatement capacity to decrease their emissions
per unit of production. We suppose that this abatement capacity requires,
and is positively related to, R&D activities. We shall distinguish between two
types of R&D e¤ort, namely, original R&D, denoted xoi ;and absorptive capacity
R&D, denoted xai . To x ideas, think about original R&D as activities related
to, e.g., develop better air-ltering systems, whereas absorptive capacity R&D
corresponds to e¤ort dedicated to improve rms technological monitoring ca-
pacity through, e.g., hiring engineers and technicians and buying information
technologies (IT) equipment. Following the R&D literature (see, e.g., Kamien
and Zang (2000)), we assume that the total knowledge available (referred also
to as e¤ective R&D level in the literature) to rm i:
xi = x
o
i + ( + lx
a
i )x
o
j ;
where  2 [0; 1) is a parameter capturing the free and exogenous spillover and
l > 0 is a learning parameter.
Denote by ei
 
xoi ; x
a
i ; x
o
j

the emissions per unit of production. It is assumed
that ei
 
xoi ; x
a
i ; x
o
j

is decreasing in all its arguments. For simplicity, we adopt
the following functional form1
ei(x
o
i ; x
a
i ; x
o
j) = 1  xoi   ( + lxai )xoj :
Consequently, total emissions by rm i are given by:
Ei(qi; x
o
i ; x
a
i ; x
o
j) =

1  xoi   ( + lxai )xoj

qi:
The damage cost resulting from these emissions is given by Di = Ei, where
 > 0 is the marginal disutility of pollution.
We suppose that the cost of R&D activity of type m = o; a; given by
Cm (xmi ) ; as well as the production cost gi (qi) ; are given by increasing con-
vex functions satisfying Cm (0) = gi (0) = 0. For simplicity, we adopt the
1Actually, one needs rst to translate R&D e¤ort into abatement. One easy way of doing
it is to suppose that
ei(x
o
i ; x
a
i ; x
o
j ) = e
0
i   fi
 
xoi ; x
a
i ; x
o
j

;
where e0i corresponds to emissions per unit of production in the absence of any abatement e¤ort
and fi

xoi ; x
a
i ; x
o
j

is a function transforming R&D e¤ort into abatement. Our formulation
assumes
e0i = 1 and fi
 
xoi ; x
a
i ; x
o
j

= xoi + ( + lx
a
i )x
o
j :
5
following quadratic functional forms
Cm (xmi ) = k
m (xmi )
2
; km > 0; m = o; a;
gi (qi) = q
2
i :
On the top of regulating the rms through taxation, the regulator subsidizes
R&D activities; he o¤ers a per-unit subsidy roi for original R&D, and a per-unit
subsidy rai for absorptive capacity R&D e¤ort.
The before taxes and subsidies prot of rm i is given by:
i(qi; qj ; x
o
i ; x
a
i ) = p(qi; qj)qi   q2i   ko (xoi )2   ka (xai )2 ;
and its after taxes and subsidies prot by:
Vi(qi; qj ; x
o
i ; x
a
i ; x
o
j) = i   tiEi + roi xoi + rai xai :
The regulator aims at maximizing the total social welfare, which is equal to
the consumer surplus CS, minus damages and subsidies, plus taxes and the net
prots of the rms, i.e.,
S(qi; qj ; x
o
i ; x
o
j ; x
a
i ; x
a
j ) = CS  Di  Dj +i +j : (1)
The consumer surplus corresponding to the consumption of Q = qi + qj is:
CS(qi; qj) =
Z qi+qj
0
p(u)du  p(qi; qj)(qi + qj) = 1
2
(qi + qj)
2: (2)
3 The socially optimal production and R&D lev-
els
In terms of sequence of moves, the game is played as follows. In the rst stage,
the regulator announces its tax and subsidy rates, i.e., the triplet (ti; roi ; r
a
i ) ; i =
1; 2. In stage 2, the rms choose their investments in both types of R&D and
in the last stage, their outputs. As usual, to obtain a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium, we solve the game in the reverse order.
The rst-order conditions of the regulators third stage are:
@S
@qi
=
@S
@qj
= 0: (3)
The resolution of system (3) gives:
q^i =
1
8
 
2a   2   3     lxaj xoi + (1  3   3lxai )xoj : (4)
The symmetric expression of (4) is:
q^i =
1
4
[a  +  (1 +  + lxai )xoi ] : (5)
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A su¢ cient condition for production quantities to be positive is
 < a; (6)
that is, the marginal damage cost is lower that the maximum willingness to pay.
We assume from now on that this condition is fullled.
The rst-order conditions of the regulators second stage are:2
dS
dxoi
=
@q^i
@xoi
@S
@qi
+
@q^j
@xoi
@S
@qj
+
@S
@xoi
= 0; (7)
dS
dxai
=
@q^i
@xai
@S
@qi
+
@q^j
@xai
@S
@qj
+
@S
@xai
= 0; (8)
dS
dxoj
=
@q^i
@xoj
@S
@qi
+
@q^j
@xoj
@S
@qj
+
@S
@xoj
= 0; (9)
dS
dxaj
=
@q^i
@xaj
@S
@qi
+
@q^j
@xaj
@S
@qj
+
@S
@xaj
= 0: (10)
At the equilibrium, equations (7)-(10) are simplied, and the symmetric
solutions verify the following equations system:
 (1 +  + lxai ) q^i   2koxoi = 0; (11)
lxoi q^i   2kaxai = 0; (12)
where q^i is given by (5), and (11) and (12) are equivalent to:
 (1 +  + lxai ) [a  +  (1 +  + lxai )xoi ]  8koxoi = 0; (13)
lxoi [a  +  (1 +  + lxai )xoi ]  8kaxai = 0: (14)
The resolution of system (13)-(14) gives the socially optimal R&D levels x^oi
and x^ai : From (13), we have:
x^oi =
(a  )(1 +  + lx^ai )
8ko   2 (1 +  + lx^ai )2
: (15)
From (14), we have:
x^ai =
l [a  + (1 + )x^oi ] x^oi
8ka   2l2x^o2i
: (16)
Proposition 1 There is a unique solution x^oi > 0 and x^
a
i > 0 that solves the
equations system given by (13) and (14).
Proof. See Appendix.
Conjecture 1 We conjecture that
lim
ko;ka!+1
x^oi = lim
ko;ka!+1
x^ai = 0: (17)
2The second order conditions are veried in the appendix when k0 and ka are high enough.
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This conjecture makes sense intuitively because when the investment cost
parameters are very high, its socially optimal to not invest in R&D. Condition
(6) guarantees that the socially optimal levels of innovation are positive when
ko and ka are high enough.
From (15) and (16), we can show that:
lim
ko;ka!+1
kox^oi =
1
8
(1 + )(a  ); lim
ko;ka!+1
kax^ai = 0: (18)
From (11) and (12), we can show that:
x^oi =
s
ka(1 + )
kol
+
ka
ko
x^ai

x^ai : (19)
Proposition 2 It holds that:
i) If ka > ko, or if l is low enough, then x^oi > x^ai :
ii) If ka < koand l is high enough, then x^ai > x^
o
i :
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that the socially optimal R&D level of original research
is higher than the one of absorptive capacity when the learning parameter is low
enough, or when the investment cost parameter of original research is lower than
the one of absorptive capacity. The investment in absorptive capacity is higher
only when the investment cost parameter of absorptive capacity is lower that
the one of original research and when the learning parameter is high enough.
4 The socially optimal emissions tax and R&D
subsidies
In this section, we determine the best response of the players to the regulators
announcement of the triplet (ti; roi ; r
a
i ) ; i = 1; 2. As stated before, the regulator
made its announcement in the rst stage and the rms react by rst determining
their R&D investments (second stage), and next their outputs (third stage).
Again, the game is solved backward.
In the third stage, the rms optimize their after taxes and subsidies prot
given by:
Vi(qi; qj ; x
o
i ; x
a
i ; x
o
j) = i   tiEi + roi xoi + rai xai :
Solving the rst-order conditions for this stage
@Vi
@qi
=
@Vj
@qj
= 0; (20)
leads to
qi =
1
15
 
3a  4ti

1  xoi   ( + lxai )xoj

+ tj

1  xoj  
 
 + lxaj

xoi

: (21)
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The partial derivatives set for the symmetric case are:
@qi
@xoi
=
ti
15
(4     lxai );
@qi
@xai
=
4
15
tilx
o
i ;
@qi
@xoj
=
ti
15
(4 [ + lxai ]  1);
@qi
@xaj
=   ti
15
lxoi :
Consider the case of a positive emissions tax. When a rm increases its level
of original or absorptive research, its emissions/output ratio decreases enabling
it to expand its production. When the competing rm increases its original
research, this has two opposite e¤ects on the production of the rm: because
of R&D spillovers and absorptive capacity, the emissions ratio of the rm de-
creases enabling it to expand its production; the second e¤ect is a negative
one and obliges the rm to decrease its production because the competing one
can increase its production due to the decrease of its emissions/output ratio.
When  and/or l are high enough, the rst positive e¤ect dominates. When the
competing rm increases its absorptive capacity, its emissions ratio decreases
enabling it to expand its production which forces the rm to reduce its produc-
tion.
The symmetric expression of (21) is:
qi =
1
5
(a  ti [1  xoi   ( + lxai )xoi ]) : (22)
The rst-order conditions of rm is second stage are:3
dVi
dxoi
=
@qi
@xoi
@Vi
@qi
+
@qj
@xoi
@Vi
@qj
+
@Vi
@xoi
= 0; (23)
dVi
dxai
=
@qi
@xai
@Vi
@qi
+
@qj
@xai
@Vi
@qj
+
@Vi
@xai
= 0: (24)
At the equilibrium, (23)-(24) are simplied, and the following equations are
satised for symmetric solution(s):
4ti (4     lxai ) qi   30koxoi + 15roi = 0; (25)
16tilx
o
i q

i   30kaxai + 15rai = 0; (26)
where qi is given by (22).
System (25)-(26) contains two equations and two unknown variables which
are xoi and x
a
i . Since the emissions taxes and R&D subsidies are set to push
rms attaining the socially optimal production and R&D levels, then the optimal
emissions tax and R&D subsidies should be chosen such that x^oi and x^
a
i are the
solution of equations system (25)-(26).
Therefore, from (22) we have:
ti =
a  5q^i
1  (1 +  + lx^ai )x^oi
; (27)
3The second order conditions are veried in the appendix when k0 and ka are high enough.
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and
lim
ko;ka!+1
ti =
1
4
(5  a): (28)
Note that
lim
ko;ka!+1
ti < 0,  < a=5:
Therefore, when the marginal damage of pollution is low enough, the regulator
actually subsidizes pollution (or production) to deal with the duopoly distortion.
Further, from (5), we have
lim
ko;ka!+1
q^i =
1
4
(a  ) > 0: (29)
From (25)-(26), we have:
roi =
1
15
(30kox^oi   4ti [4     lx^ai ] q^i) ; (30)
rai =
1
15
(30kax^ai   16tilx^oi q^i) (31)
From (30) and (31), we deduce:
lim
ko;ka!+1
roi =
1
60
[5(4   1)+ (4  )a] (a  ); (32)
lim
ko;ka!+1
rai = 0: (33)
The following proposition compares the subsidy rates of e¤orts in original and
absorptive capacity R&D.
Proposition 3 When koand ka are high enough:
i) The R&D subsidy for original research is always higher than the one for
absorptive capacity when   1=4;
ii) The R&D subsidy for absorptive capacity is higher when  < 1=19 and 
is high enough.
Proof. See Appendix.
The above proposition shows that the regulator gives a greater support to
original research when the free R&D spillovers are important. However, when
the free R&D spillovers are not important and consumers are very sensitive
to the protection of the environment, he gives a greater support to absorptive
research.
5 Conclusion
We considered in this paper a duopoly competing in quantities and where rms
can invest in original and absorptive R&D to control their emissions. We have
shown that a regulator can reach the social optimal outcome by implementing
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tax and subsidy schemes. The regulator subsidizes at a higher rate the absorp-
tive capacity research than original research when the free spillovers are low and
the marginal disutility of pollution is high, and the contrary occurs when the
free spillovers are high. When the cost of absorptive capacity is lower than the
one of original research and the learning parameter is high, then the socially
optimal level of absorptive capacity is higher than the one of original research.
We have the opposite result when the cost of original research is lower than the
one of absorptive research, or when the learning parameter is low.
Although we have adopted simple functional forms for demand, costs and
emissions to output ratio, we were not able to obtain explicit values for the
socially optimal R&D levels. If we were able to do so, then we would have
compared the socially optimal level of original research in the presence and
absence of absorptive capacity. This comparison is worth considering in a future
investigation since one reason evoked by the absorptive capacity literature is that
absorptive capacity may increase the R&D level and sometimes plays a better
role than RJVs (e.g., Leahy and Neary (2007)).
6 Appendix
A) Second-order conditions of the regulators second stage
Consider the Hessian Matrix:
H =
0BBBBB@
d2S
dxo2i
d2S
dxoi dx
a
i
d2S
dxoi dx
o
j
d2S
dxoi dx
a
j
d2S
dxoi dx
a
i
d2S
dxa2i
d2S
dxai dx
o
j
d2S
dxai dx
a
j
d2S
dxoi dx
o
j
d2S
dxai dx
o
j
d2S
dxo2j
d2S
dxojdx
a
j
d2S
dxoi dx
a
j
d2S
dxai dx
a
j
d2S
dxojdx
a
j
d2S
dxa2j
1CCCCCA
By using the rst-order conditions given by (7)-(10), we can compute the
second derivatives constituting matrix H which can be written as:
H =
0BB@
f1   2ko f2 f3 f4
f2 f5   2ka f6 f7
f3 f6 f8   2ko f9
f4 f7 f9 f10   2ka
1CCA ;
where fi, i = 1; :::10; are polynomial functions in xoi and x
a
i (symmetric case).
Since
lim
ko;ka!+1
x^oi = lim
ko;ka!+1
x^ai = 0;
then fi take nite values when ko and ka tend to +1:
Therefore:
i) 1 = f1   2ko < 0 when ko and ka are high enough.
ii) 2 =
f1   2ko f2f2 f5   2ka
 > 0 when ko and ka are high enough.
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iii) 3 =

f1   2ko f2 f3
f2 f5   2ka f6
f3 f6 f8   2ko
;
We have limko;ka!+13 = limko;ka!+1  8k
o2ka
ko2ka =  8. Thus, 3 < 0
when ko and ka are su¢ ciently high.
iv) 4 =

f1   2ko f2 f3 f4
f2 f5   2ka f6 f7
f3 f6 f8   2ko f9
f4 f7 f9 f10   2ka
 ;
We have
lim
ko;ka!+1
4 = lim
ko;ka!+1
16ko2ka2
ko2ka2
= 16:
Thus, 4 > 0 for ko and ka su¢ ciently high.
Therefore, we have a maximum.
B) second-order conditions of rms second stage
By using the rst-order conditions given by (23)-(24), we can show that:
i) d
2Vi
dxo2i
= g1(ti; x
a
i )  2ko, where g1 is a polynomial function in ti and xai (sym-
metric case). Since limko;ka!+1 xai and limko;ka!+1 ti are nite numbers,
then g1 takes a nite value when ko; ka ! +1. Thus, d2Vidxo2i < 0 when k
o
and ka are su¢ ciently high.
ii) d
2Vi
dxa2i
= g2(ti; x
o
i )   2ka, where g2 is a polynomial function in ti and xoi
(symmetric case). Since limko;ka!+1 xoi and limko;ka!+1 ti are nite
numbers, then g2 takes a nite value when ko; ka ! +1. Thus, d2Vidxa2i < 0
when koand ka are su¢ ciently high.
iii) d
2Vi
dxoi dx
a
i
= g3(ti; x
o
i ; x
a
i ), where g3 is a polynomial function in ti; x
o
i ;and x
a
i
(symmetric case). Since limko;ka!+1 xoi , limko;ka!+1 x
a
i and limko;ka!+1 ti
are nite numbers, then g3 takes a nite value when ko; ka ! +1.
When koand ka are high enough, we can say that:
 d2Vi
dxo2i
< 0 and d
2Vi
dxa2i
< 0, and


d2Vi
dxo2i
d2Vi
dxoi dx
a
i
d2Vi
dxoi dx
a
i
d2Vi
dxa2i
 = [g1(ti; xai )  2ko] [g2(ti; xoi )  2ka] [g3(ti; xoi ; xai )]2 > 0:
Therefore, the second-order conditions of the rms second stage are veried.
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C) Proof of Proposition 1
Expression (13) can be developed as:
(1+)(a )+2(1+)2xoi+l [a  + 2(1 + )xoi ]xai+2l2xoi (xai )2 8koxoi = 0
(34)
By using the expression of xai given by (16) in (34) and then multiplying by 
8ka   2l2xo2i
2
, we get a polynomial function of degree 5 in xoi :P (x
o
i ) = 0:
The coe¢ cient of (xoi )
5 is  84l4ko, and the constant term is 64(1+)(a 
) (ka)
2.
Since P (0) > 0 and limxoi!+1 P (x
o
i ) =  1 , then P (xoi ) admits at least
one real and positive root. We know that a polynomial of degree 5 can have at
a maximum ve roots in IR. However, since we have shown that every critical
couple of points (xoi ; x
a
i ) is a maximum when k
o and ka are su¢ ciently high,
then we have a unique solution which maximizes the social welfare. This unique
solution (x^oi ; x^
a
i ) veries x^
o
i > 0 and x^
a
i > 0 because of (6) and (17) and when
k0 and ka are high enough.
D) Proof of Proposition 2
From expression (19), we deduce the following:
i) if k0  ka, then x^oi > x^ai .
ii) if ka < k0, then
x^oi < x^
a
i ,
ka (1 +  + lx^ai )
k0l
< x^ai , x^ai >
ka (1 + )
(k0   ka) l :
If l is high enough, then x^oi < x^
a
i . If l is low enough, then it is the other
way around (x^oi > x^
a
i ).
E) Proof of Proposition 3
From (32) and (33):
limko;ka!+1 roi > limko;ka!+1 r
a
i , 5(4   1)+ (4  )a > 0:
i) If  > 1=4, the above inequality is always satised.
ii) If  < 1=4, limko;ka!+1 roi < limko;ka!+1 r
a
i ,  > (4 )a5(1 4) . This last
inequality is not in contradiction with (6) i¤  < 1=19.
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